Transforming valences through transitive inference: How are faces emotionally dissonant? by Amd, Micah & Roche, Bryan
Transforming valences through transitive inference: How are faces
emotionally dissonant?
Micah Amd a,b and Bryan Rochea
aDepartment of Psychology, Maynooth University Maynooth, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland; bDepartment of Psychology, Federal
University of São Carlos, São Carlos, SP, Brazil
ABSTRACT
Information that is emotionally incongruous with self-concepts can produce feelings
of unease. This implies that embedding incongruous information in newly formed
relational structures would have little effect on their previous emotive properties.
Alternatively, Relational Frame Theory highlights the importance of contextualized
stimulus-stimulus relations, where the structure of a relational series is key in
determining the function of its elements. To see whether series membership can
mitigate ‘dissonance’ when a salient element is employed, the present investigation
trained and tested a seven-term relational series (X>A>B>C>D>E>Y) using blurred
faces as stimuli. Specifically, Stimuli X, A, B, D, E and Y were blurred unfamiliar faces
and Stimulus C constituted of the participant’s own blurred face, assumed to be
more salient than the former. To assess how the valences of the related stimuli
were transformed by relational series membership, self-report ratings and
electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings were collected before and after training
the X>A>B>C>D>E>Y series. These pre vs. post contrasts revealed that, for
unfamiliar faces, stimulus valence transformed as a function of relational structure.
Conversely, the lack of difference in pre vs. post contrasts of Stimulus C, which
maintained a high valence, suggest that relational series membership may not
suffice to mitigate emotionally dissonant information.
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Our perceptions of emotionality from others’ faces are
typically determined by the various observable
characteristics of the latter, even when we are
unaware of which characteristics we may be attending
to per se (e.g., Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000;
Esteves & Öhman, 1993). Indeed, even faces norma-
tively rated as exhibiting “neutral” expressions have
been shown to evoke some degree of differential
responding (e.g., Mignault & Chaudhuri, 2003). If no
emotional information can be gleaned from one’s
face, however, its emotional properties can be
derived based on the relationships it shares with
other faces within a relational structure (Amd &
Roche, 2015, 2016; Silveira et al., 2015). For instance,
if provided the relational information “Adam is
happier than Bob”, or Adam >happy Bob (where
“Adam” and “Bob” are emotionally masked faces)
then, holding all other factors constant, it is likely
that an individual will respond to Adam as happier
than Bob (e.g., Amd, 2014; Amd & Roche, 2015; for
similar effects with non-face stimuli, see Dougher,
Hamilton, Fink, & Harrington, 2007; Dymond,
Schlund, Roche, & Whelan, 2014; Roche & Dymond,
2008). In such cases, the “happiness” functions
(valences) of Adam and Bob have transformed in
accordance with the newly established relational
structure Adam >happy Bob. According to one
account of symbolic stimulus relations (relational
frame theory, or RFT; Hayes, Barnes-holmes, & Roche,
2001), the determining feature in such “transform-
ations” is the context in which the face stimuli were
related (e.g., the presence of the “is happier than”
phrase), summarized as a transformation of function
(TOF) effect (Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000). There
appears to be some evidence that embedding face
stimuli in context-specific relational structures can
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transform their valences predictably (cf. Amd, 2014;
Amd & Roche, 2016).
This line of investigation is important for at least
two reasons. First, research on the perception of
emotion on faces has typically employed face stimuli
that exhibit natural (Haxby & Gobbini, 2007; Wheatley,
Weinberg, Looser, Moran, & Hajcak, 2011) or artificial
(Seyama & Nagayama, 2007) emotional expressions.
Such studies typically explore the emotion-eliciting
functions of various facial characteristics (e.g.,
Leopold & Rhodes, 2010). By employing faces whose
emotional-eliciting features have been concealed (as
per the recommendations of Bassili, 1979), however,
it becomes possible to understand the effect of rela-
tional structure membership on their valences, rather
than the perception of facial features per se (Amd &
Roche, 2015). Continuing along the line of some
recent findings (e.g., Amd & Roche, 2015; Silveira
et al., 2015), emotional TOF studies using faces have
highlighted the importance of membership within
newly established relational structures (versus pre-
existing ones; see Lakens, Semin, & Foroni, 2012) in
manipulating stimulus valence (Amd & Roche, 2016).
This is why blurred faces were employed as stimuli
in the present study, given previous findings
showing happiness/valence TOF effects as most pro-
nounced when emotionally masked faces are
embedded in relational structures (Amd, 2014; Amd
& Roche, 2015; but see Amd, Barnes-Holmes, &
Ivanoff, 2013, for a non-face-related exception). This
may have to do with the conspecific nature of faces,
which humans can discriminate accurately from early
in life (e.g., Bonatti, Frot, Zangl, & Mehler, 2002). This
may also explain why “happiness” may be most
readily perceived across a facial dimension (e.g.,
Ekman & Friesen, 1971). By manipulating the valence
of otherwise homogeneous faces through relational
categorization (cf. Dymond & Roche, 2013), we can
better understand how doing so can affect emotional
face perception when the faces involved are emotion-
ally “neutral” (e.g., Todorov & Engell, 2008).
The current study also investigates a key prediction
arising from research into “emotional dissonance”
(Jansz & Timmers, 2002), a term that refers to the
feeling of unease produced by information that is
emotionally incongruous with notions related to
one’s self. At a process level, such dissonance may
arise when emotionally disparate elements participate
in the same relational knowledge structure, yielding
feelings that are conflicting. Some theorists (e.g.,
Barnes, 1994; Salzinger, 2008) have proposed that
membership within an appropriate relational structure
should suffice to alter the emotional properties of rela-
tional elements, regardless of formal stimulus charac-
teristics. The concept of “emotional dissonance”
would suggest otherwise, however. Specifically, the lit-
erature on emotional dissonance suggests that any
emotional incoherence obtained between an
emotional stimulus and one’s own self creates a disso-
nance, and along with this come feelings of unease.
Real-life occurrences of emotional dissonance can be
found in a variety of situations—for instance, among
call centre workers (Lewig & Dollard, 2003). It is not
uncommon for such workers to encounter clients
who are rude, with whom the former must neverthe-
less maintain an air of professionalism while inhibiting
more natural tendencies (e.g., Greenberg & Alge,
1998). The underlying dissonance arises from not
being able to respond unequivocally to an irate
client, and is strongly related to high turnover rates
and absenteeism in the industry (James, 1998). In
plain terms, the negative emotionality of the external
stimulus (a rude client) contradicts the generally posi-
tive emotionality of self-held notions (of competence)
to yield feelings of dissonance.
The example highlights how diametrically valenced
events/stimuli can participate in the same knowledge
structure as that of related elements and still maintain
their disparate functions (cf. Dymond, Roche, Forsyth,
Whelan, & Rhoden, 2007). In such cases, TOF appears
limited since the salience of the negative emotional
event (client rudeness) does not seem to be mitigated
by self-beliefs of competence, which are generally
positive. This suggests that deriving stimulus–stimulus
relations may not suffice to alleviate dissonance if the
related stimuli were highly salient a priori. In other
words, TOF may not be relevant when series consist
of highly salient elements. On balance, several find-
ings in the TOF literature (Amd & Roche, 2015;
Dymond & Roche, 2013; Dymond et al., 2007; Hayes
et al., 2001; Silveira et al., 2015) suggest that relational
structure membership plays a determining role in
altering the emotional properties of embedded
elements, even when salient or familiar stimuli are
used (e.g., Amd et al., 2013; Fields, Arntzen, Nartey, &
Eilifsen, 2012). Indeed, if participating in relational
knowledge structures was unimportant in mitigating
valences of any of its elements, then the “meaning”
of abstract stimuli could not be determined by seman-
tic networks, which clearly do have the capacity to
alter stimulus meaning (Harnad, 1990; but also see
Stemmer, 1973).
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In order to better understand the effect of introdu-
cing a salient stimulus amongst a set of topographi-
cally similar (but less salient) stimuli, the present
study established a relational series with an already
salient element (i.e., the participant’s own face) as a
member. This allowed us to determine whether the
emotional valence of an already salient stimulus
could be altered in accordance with the transform-
ations for other members of a series (Amd & Roche,
2016). In turn, this will inform us as to whether
valence TOF is affected more so by the highly salient
emotional element (which was the participant’s own
face in the present experiment) through associative
transfer processes (e.g., Bialer, 1961) or the structure
of the relational series involved (Amd & Roche,
2015). Either finding will highlight the role of TOF in
relation to emotional dissonance.
Assessing TOF through contextually controlled
transitive inference
One means of assessing valence TOF—namely, rela-
tional structures—is through contextually controlled
transitive inference, or TI (e.g., Amd & Roche, 2016;
Dougher et al., 2007). Briefly, TI refers to the derivation
of relations between stimuli that have never been
paired together formally but are nevertheless related
by at least one mediating node (Fields, Adams,
Verhave, & Newman, 1990; Munnelly, Dymond, &
Hinton, 2010; Vasconcelos, 2008). Following from our
previous example, if one learns that “Adam is
happier than Bob”, and “Bob is happier than Cindy”,
deriving “Adam is happier than Cindy” would consti-
tute a demonstration of TI, where the mediating
stimulus is Bob. Additionally, if one were to then
present the “Adam/Cindy” stimulus pair alongside a
cue meaning “is unhappier than”, the inferred dis-
crimination would reverse, as in “Cindy is unhappier
than Adam”. Such TIs are “contextually controlled” as
the correct discrimination (happier than [Adam
+/Cindy–] or unhappier than [Cindy+/Adam–]) is con-
tingent upon the specific contextual cue present
(“happier than” or “unhappier than”). Deriving these
transitive relations can transform the “happiness”
functions of Adam, Bob, and Cindy in accordance
with a Adam >happy Bob >happy Cindy relational struc-
ture. That is, given “Adam is happier than Bob”, and
“Bob is happier than Cindy”, Adam should be
responded to as the most positively valenced, Bob
as intermediately valenced, and Cindy as the most
negatively valenced (Amd & Roche, 2016). By
embedding emotionally masked face stimuli in a rela-
tional structure in such manner, it becomes possible to
determine the extent to which term valences
transform.
A recent study demonstrated the emergence of
individual valence gradients in accordance with a
five-term series using face-type stimuli (Amd &
Roche, 2016). In the study, participants first rated
five face silhouettes (categorized as A, B, C, D, and E)
along a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from “happy” to
“unhappy”) as their electroencephalographs (EEGs)
were recorded. These were analysed to yield “base-
line” valences of the five face stimuli. Next, a sequence
of conditional discriminations established two
abstract shapes as contextual cues functionally equiv-
alent to the phrases “is happier than” and “is unhap-
pier than”, respectively.1 Next, participants were
shown the A/B, B/C, C/D, and D/E pairs in the presence
of the happier than cue, where the discriminations
reinforced were A+/B–, B+/C–, C+/D–, and D+/E–.
This was followed by tests for functional symmetry
and transitivity, which involved presenting the pairs
described above along with the A/C, B/D, and A/E
pairs in the presence of both happier than and unhap-
pier than cues without corrective feedback. Finally,
participants had to once again rate the A, B, C, D,
and E stimuli as their EEGs were collected. Among
the participants who correctly derived the transitive
relations, contrasting the baseline versus post ratings
and EEGs revealed the valences of the A, B, C, D, and
E stimuli to fall along gradients corresponding with
the structure of the relational series established (i.e.,
A >happy B >happy C >happy D >happy E).
One finding worth noting was the robust outcomes
along the EEG metric used, which involved measuring
hemispheric differences across individualized alpha
bands over anterior regions (frontal alpha asymmetry,
or FAA; see Bazanova & Vernon, 2014; Klimesch, 1999).
Briefly, FAA describes the power difference in indivi-
dually determined “alpha” bandwidths between the
left and right anterior regions of the brain, where
increased levels of alpha activation over the left
lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC; relative to right LPFC)
is associated with positive/approach-related affect,
and increased activation over the right LPFC (relative
to left LPFC) is associated with negative/avoidance-
related affect (Briesemeister, Tamm, Heine, & Jacobs,
2013; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Hagemann,
Naumann, Becker, Maier, & Bartussek, 1998; Papousek,
Reiser, Weber, Freudenthaler, & Schulter, 2012). In
Amd and Roche’s (2016) study, stimulus-elicited
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FAAs appeared sensitive to the newly established
valence gradients for the stimuli in the series. Given
that FAAs can differentiate between valenced stimuli
in humans from as early as two years of age (Davidson
& Fox, 1989) and are arguably less broad in scope
(Briesemeister et al., 2013, but see Coan & Allen,
2004) than other EEG metrics of valence (such as
event-related potentials; see Amd et al., 2013; Patel
& Azzam, 2005), the authors concluded that the
observed FAA gradients might be reflective of
derived valence TOFs.
The findings reported by Amd and Roche (2016)
constituted the first published demonstration of indi-
vidual valence gradients across face stimuli within a
relational structure using explicit, implicit, and electro-
physiological measures concurrently. Importantly, the
changes in stimulus valence were not due to differen-
tial pairing histories between the faces and pre-exper-
imentally salient (unconditioned) stimuli but the
relational structure of the series established. This
finding stands apart from the extensive literature on
“semantic generalization” (cf. Feather, 1965) for at
least two reasons. First, as there was no target stimulus
that was emotionally conditioned a priori, emotional
functions could not generalize along the basis of
pre-existing stimulus associations (but see Boyle,
Roche, Dymond, & Hermans, 2016). Second, when
comparing the pre and post valences measured for
the face stimuli, the valences for some stimuli (particu-
larly Stimulus A) were shown to be enhanced in the
post condition, countering common knowledge
regarding generalization gradients (e.g., Cofer &
Foley, 1942; Hermans, Baeyens, & Vervliet, 2013). On
balance, the “enhancement” may have been driven
at least partially by the “end-anchor” effect (Wynne,
1995), which simply means that the stimulus whose
selection was always reinforced (Stimulus A) and the
stimulus whose selection was never reinforced (Stimu-
lus E) evoked differentially ratings/FAAs due to their
differential reinforcement histories.
Two additional methodological limitations of the
Amd and Roche (2016) study are worth noting. First,
the sample employed was quite small (n = 10), from
whom only 6 participants were able to produce the
correct transitive relations. Second, the ratings/EEGs
acquired for Stimulus C (the intermediate term in
the A–B–C–D–E series) were inconsistent across par-
ticipants, even among those who demonstrated TI.
While this may have been an artefact of the small
sample size and/or the position of the stimulus
within the series, an alternative preparation could
involve a stimulus that was emotionally salient a
priori in order to definitively demonstrate whether
the emergent valence gradient was a function of the
relational series established. Given that the stimulus
employed for this purpose in the current study was
an image of the subject’s own face, this also allowed
us to examine whether any dissonance in valence
within the relational series would persist (given the
high emotional valence of the self-face stimulus), or
whether it could be transformed in accordance with
the structure of the established series.
The current research addresses the above limit-
ations while expanding upon the findings of the
Amd and Roche (2016) study in two important ways.
First, the relational series trained here involved
seven stimuli (X, A, B, C, D, E, Y) rather than five,
where only the intermediate A–B–C–D–E stimuli
were assessed. This was done in order to mitigate
for potential end anchor effects that may have con-
founded the results in Amd and Roche (2016).
Second, the intermediate term in the series (Stimulus
C) consisted of the participant’s own face, which was
likely to be highly emotionally salient (Sifferlin,
2013). By incorporating such a stimulus, we could
determine whether establishing a relational series in
the presence of a valence-occasioning context
(similar to that enacted by the phrase “is happier
than”) would suffice to transform the valences of all
stimuli within the structure, even a highly salient
one. If so, we could conclude that TOF in relational
knowledge structures is a key process in alleviating
effects borne of emotional dissonance (by placing
related elements along a similar valence gradient).
Alternatively, it may be the case that the pre-existing
emotional properties of a highly salient stimulus is
not altered by membership in a relational series.
Such an observation would highlight a boundary con-
dition for the TOF effect, where contextual control
over stimulus–stimulus relations may not suffice to
transform the valences of stimuli that are already
highly salient a priori. Furthermore, if membership
within a relational structure does not suffice to alter
the valence of its related elements in accordance
with the series (cf. Amd & Roche, 2015), we will have
a clearer understanding of how dissonant emotions
can arise from elements that otherwise participate in
the same relational structure.
The present study commenced with participants
providing happiness ratings of the A, B, C, D, and E
stimuli along a Likert scale while their EEGs were
recorded in order to measure baseline valences for
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the stimuli. Next, two abstract shapes were estab-
lished as contextual cues equivalent to the phrases
“is happier than” and “is unhappier than”, respectively.
This was followed by a series of conditional discrimi-
nations designed to establish the relations X >happy
A, A >happy B, B >happy C, C >happy D, D >happy E, and
E >happy Y, followed by tests for symmetry and transi-
tivity among the stimuli in the series. Finally, the emo-
tionality of the face-stimuli were once again assessed
using the Likert scale and EEG recordings (both
measures were adapted from Amd & Roche, 2016).
The predictions made in accordance with the TOF
effect were as follows. First, the A and B stimuli were
predicted to evoke higher happiness ratings and a
more positive FAA relative to baseline measurements,
while stimuli D and E were predicted to evoke the
opposite pattern. Second, the ratings/FAAs for the A,
B, D, and E stimuli were predicted to correspond
along the gradient suggested by the X >happy A
>happy B >happy C >happy D >happy E >happy Y series
during the post condition only. Satisfying these pre-
dictions would indicate that the valences of the
blurred faces had transformed in accordance with
the relational structure of the series trained. A third
prediction involved the valences recorded for the C
stimulus (own face). Specifically, if the valence of C
post series establishment falls between those
recorded for the B and D stimuli, we can conclude
that relational categorization can overcome pre-exist-
ing stimulus saliences. Alternatively, observing no
change in Stimulus C valence would suggest that
salient elements maintain their valence within con-
flicting relational structures. Either finding would be





Twenty-six participants were recruited through per-
sonal invitation from among the student body at May-
nooth University. Participants were paid €10 ($13 USD
approx.) for participating in the study, which was pro-
vided upon their arrival to the laboratory. Two partici-
pants were excluded due to the presence of at least 30
seconds of artefact-laden EEG data while four partici-
pants withdrew at various stages of the study for per-
sonal reasons, leaving a final sample of 12 females and
8 males (M = 23.2 years, SD = 1.8). All participants were
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision with no confounding medical history (e.g.,
drug/medication use, seizures, depression, or schizo-
phrenia). All participants provided written consent
for participation. The study was approved by the May-
nooth University bio-medical research ethics
committee.
Materials
Face stimuli for the relational training and testing
phase were taken from the Radboud Faces Database
(Langner et al., 2010). Two sets of face stimuli were
employed during the present task. The first set
involved 8 faces with happy, 8 faces with neutral,
and 8 faces with unhappy expressions, respectively,
all of which were employed during the contextual
cue training and testing phase only (see Figure 1b).
The second set comprised six faces, labelled as A, B,
D, E, X, and Y, as well as the participant’s own face,
labelled as C—these stimuli were to be used during
the transitive inference training and testing stage
(see Figure 1a). For the second set of faces, the zygo-
matic major and orbicularis oculi muscles were blurred
in order to make the faces as emotionally homo-
geneous as possible (Bassili, 1979; Ekman, Davidson,
& Friesen, 1990). Additionally, the mouth-regions of
all face stimuli in the second set were masked by
gender-specific names.
Electroencephalographic set-up and analysis
EEG activity was recorded using 26 silver/silver chlor-
ide electrodes on an amplifier supplied by BrainVision
(QuickAmp, BrainProducts, Germany). The electrodes
were mounted in an elastic cap and were fastened
with a chin strap (Easy-Cap, Herrsching, Germany).
Data were collected from electrode sites correspond-
ing with the International 10-20 system for electrode
placement. Similar to the set-up in Amd and Roche
(2016), EEG activity was recorded over frontal (Fp1,
Fp2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, Fz), central (C1, C2, C3, C4,
Cz), temporal (T1, T2), parietal (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6,
Pz), and occipital (O1, O2, Oz) regions. The reference
electrode was located at the tip of the nose during
recording and was re-referenced to Cz during analy-
sis.2 Both vertical and horizontal eye movements
were detected from four electrodes located above
and below the eyes. Blink and drift artefacts were
removed off-line manually. To minimize “noise” gener-
ated by ocular and muscular artefacts (Hagemann,
2004), participants were instructed to refrain from
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blinking/moving their eyes/head during EEG record-
ing phases.
Data were recorded at 256,000 bits per second,
with all impedances being kept within a range of 5–
9 kΏ. The voltage differences between the recording
and reference electrodes were extracted and ampli-
fied along a bandpass of 0.16–60 Hz with a gain of
1000 and were notch-filtered at 50 Hz. The conversion
rate was set at 2000 Hz per channel within a 150-V
range. EEG data were analysed offline using BESA
Figure 1. (a) Stimuli used during Part 2 of the transitive inference (TI) task (see Procedure). On the top left are stimuli employed during training
and testing of stimulus relations (e.g., X is happier than A). On the top right are the shapes trained as contextual cues. The functions of the cues
were established through a series of rewarded and non-rewarded conditional discriminations in the presence of alternative emotional faces (see
Figure 1b). On the bottom panel is a self-image stimulus before (bottom-left) and after (bottom-right) image processing. Note how all regions of
the face were blurred to minimize unintended stimulus control (Mcllvane & Dube, 2003). (b) Stimuli used for establishing contextual cue func-
tions. On the left side are some of the exemplars employed during training trials (i.e., with corrective feedback); on the right side are some of the
exemplars employed during non-rewarded test trials. Note that the trained and tested discriminations constituted the following: In the presence
of Cue 1 (see Figure 1a), the rewarded patterns were happy+/neutral–, neutral+/unhappy–, happy+/unhappy–. In the presence of Cue 2, the
rewarded patterns were unhappy+/happy–, neutral+/happy–, unhappy+/neutral–.
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software. Specifically, epochs were defined from 0 ms
to 2048 ms post stimulus onset. Fast Fourier trans-
forms (FFT) were conducted over individualized 5-Hz
bins within the 8–13-Hz frequency band to calculate
power values, which were subsequently normalized
(see Klimesch, 1999, for details regarding calculation
of individualized alpha bands). Frontal alpha asymme-
try (FAA) values were calculated as the normalized
difference score between right (R) and left (L) hemi-
spheric sites, utilizing the formula (R – L)/(R + L)
(Allen, Urry, Hitt, & Coan, 2004). According to Klimesch
(1999), greater alpha power over right, relative to left,
anterior regions indicate greater left frontal activation
(L > R) whereas greater alpha power over left, relative
to right, anterior regions, indicate greater right frontal
activation (R > L). The L > R and R > L activation pat-
terns are indicated by positive and negative FAA
values, respectively (Allen, Coan, & Nazarian, 2004;
Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010). The F3, F4,
F7, and F8 electrode were selected to calculate FAA,
in accordance with previous conventions (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2010) and for the sake of consistency
(Amd & Roche, 2016).
Procedure
Upon receiving consent, each participant was photo-
graphed, and a head and shoulders image was
created. These images were then matched for lumin-
osity, contrast, resolution, and saturation levels in
accordance with the six other face-stimuli employed
(Figure 1a). This was to minimize unintended stimulus
control during training (cf. Mcllvane & Dube, 2003).
The participant’s own name was placed over the
bottom half of the modified face stimulus and was
included as Stimulus C in subsequent phases. Partici-
pants were not provided with any verbal information
as to why their pictures were taken beyond the state-
ment “It is a necessary part of the present study. You
will be de-briefed completely when we finish”.
Phase 1: Baseline. Self-report/frontal alpha asymmetry.
Participants were seated in a Faraday shielded room in
front of a 14′′ Dell computer screen. After the electro-
des had been attached, and the impedance levels had
been checked to be appropriate (i.e., <10 kΏ), partici-
pants were instructed to relax and orient towards a
white fixation point on a blank, black screen for 3
minutes, followed by an automated prompt to close
their eyes for a further 3 minutes, during which their
EEG was recorded. The eyes-open (EO) followed by
eyes-closed (EC) procedure enabled identification of
individual alpha bandwidths (IABs). The procedure
for calculating IABs was devised by Klimesch (1999)
and consists of the following steps: first, calculate
the power spectra for the EO and EC conditions separ-
ately. Next, define the “transition frequency” (TF) as
the point at which “theta” (enhanced spectra during
task performance) and “alpha” (suppressed spectra
during task performance) intersect. An individual’s
IAB may be calculated as the range between TF and
TF + 5 (Klimesch, 1999, p. 171). Following EO–EC
recording, the following instructions appeared on
screen:
Welcome. In this part of the experiment, you will first see
an image come up on screen. Please pay attention to the
image. After a few moments, five boxes will appear near
the bottom of the image. Please indicate how “happy” or
“unhappy” the image makes you feel by clicking on the
appropriate box (1 = happy, 2 = somewhat happy, 3 =
neutral, 4 = somewhat unhappy, 5 = unhappy) with the
mouse. Please respond using the index finger on your
right hand ONLY during all stages of the experiment. IT
IS IMPORTANT that you refrain from moving your head
and blinking/moving your eyes when the image first
appears—you may blink/move your head after the
boxes have appeared. Please ask the experimenter if
you have any further questions—otherwise press any
key to begin. . . .
When a key was pressed, a blank screen with a ﬁxation
cross was displayed for 300 ms, followed by a face
stimulus (A, B, C, D, or E) presented for 2000 ms in
the centre of the screen. After 2000 ms, a mouse
cursor and ﬁve white boxes with the numbers 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 printed in black inside each box, respect-
ively, appeared near the bottom half of the screen.
Participants were required to move the cursor to
one of the boxes and click on it in order to continue
(clicking anywhere else on the screen did not have
any effect). This was followed by the re-appearance
of the ﬁxation cross on a blank screen for 300 ms,
after which the next trial commenced. Each of the
ﬁve face stimuli appeared 15 times, leading to a
block total of 75 trials. Completion of 75 trials termi-
nated Phase 1.
Phase 2: Transitive inference task. For ease of com-
prehension, the tasks involved in Phase 2 have been
described in two parts.
Part 1: Establishing contextual cues. The goal here
was to establish two abstract shapes as functionally
equivalent to the phrases “is happier than” and “is
unhappier than”, respectively. This was accomplished
by presenting one of three emotional face pairs (i.e.,
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happy/neutral, neutral/unhappy, happy/unhappy
pairs—see Figure 1b) in the presence of either Cue 1
or Cue 2. If a pair appeared in the presence of Cue 1,
selection of the relatively happier face was rewarded
—that is, happy+/neutral–, neutral+/unhappy–, or
happy+/unhappy–. Alternatively, if the pair appeared
in the presence of Cue 2, the selection of the relatively
unhappier face was rewarded—that is, neutral
+/happy–, unhappy+/neutral–, or unhappy+/happy–.
A correct discrimination was followed by the
message “Correct” in green font, while an incorrect
discrimination was followed by the message
“Wrong” in a red font. Participants had an unrestricted
time window to respond during any given trial. All par-
ticipants responded across all trials within 10 seconds
of stimulus presentation (see Figure 2a).
The number of training trials were fixed at 48 trials
per participant distributed across six trial blocks (see
Table 1, rows 1 and 2). Following the completion of
36 training trials across three blocks, test trials began
to appear where participants were shown novel
emotional face pairs in the presence of either Cue 1
or Cue 2. Participants had to produce the appropriate
discriminations (e.g., select happier face when Cue 1 is
presented, or select unhappier face when Cue 2 is pre-
sented) without any corrective feedback. Each partici-
pant had to undergo at least 15 test trials (from Blocks
4 to 6) within which to reach an accuracy criterion of
80%—not meeting this criterion led to a re-exposure
to the test trial block (no more training trials were pre-
sented). If the 80% criterion was not met within 45
trials, the participant would be thanked and was
excused from the study. All participants reached cri-
terion before the end of 45 trials, however.
Part 2. Participants were trained in the B+/C– and C
+/D– discriminations across 50 trials from Blocks 1–6,
followed by the X+/A–, A+/B–, D+/E–, and E+/Y– dis-
criminations across 80 trials from Blocks 2–6 (see
Table 1). Note that, similar to Part 1, the number of
training trials were fixed for all participants. Unlike
Part 1, discriminations were rewarded in the presence
of the happier than cue only. Corrective feedback for
the trained discriminations was gradually reduced
across trials, with any trial for which no feedback
was provided deemed as a “test trial” (see Table 1
for the reinforcement leaning schedule across
blocks). Briefly, participants were exposed to the dis-
criminations reinforced during training (e.g., B/C in
the presence of happier than) without feedback for
at least 78 trials from Blocks 4–6. As before, partici-
pants had to respond accurately at least 80% of the
time or be re-exposed to the testing trials for a
maximum of three cycles.
From Block 4, the X/A, A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E, and E/Y
pairs began to appear in the presence of the unhappier
than cue in trials without feedback (recall that training
with feedback took place in the presence of the
happier than cue only). These pairs appeared at least
45 times from Blocks 5–6, with an accuracy threshold
set at 80%—not meeting criterion led to re-exposure
to the test trials for a maximum of three times, as
before. These particular trials were deemed tests for
functional symmetry. For example, if a participant
learned to discriminate A+/B– in the presence of the
happier than cue, then discriminating B+/A– in the
presence of the unhappier than cue would indicate
functional symmetry (i.e., after learning A is happier
than B, responding B is unhappier than A).
Finally, trials testing for functional transitivity
began to appear in Block 6, which involved presenting
face-stimuli that had not been paired together in pre-
vious trials (e.g., A/C, B/E, C/Y) in the presence of either
happier than or unhappier than (i.e., Cue 1 or Cue 2)
across a minimum of 75 trials. A successful demon-
stration of functional transitivity involved responding
in accordance with previously established relations—
for instance, upon learning A+/B– and B+/C– in the
presence of happier than, subsequently responding
A+/C– in the presence of happier than, or C+/A– in
the presence of unhappier than, would constitute suc-
cessful, transitive responses given that the relations
trained were A is happier than B, and B is happier
than C. An accuracy criterion of 80% was set for
these test trials as well, with the maximum number
of re-exposures to test trials set at three. Completion
of test trials signalled the end of Part 2. Note that all
participants underwent a fixed number of training
trials, while the proportion of test trial types were con-
tingent on individual participant performance. All par-
ticipants completed the test trial requirements within
three exposures to the test block.
Phase 3: Post assessment. All tasks from Phase 1 were
re-administered. That is, participants had to rate the A,
B, C, D, and E stimuli as their EEG was recorded. Com-
pletion of 75 trials signalled the end of the experiment.
Results
Self-report
Mean ratings for the A, B, C, D, and E stimuli are pre-
sented in Table 2 and Figure 3. The values were
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Figure 2. (a) (Left side) trial sequence during the transitive inference (TI) task. Each trial commenced with a plain fixation cross on a blank screen for
300 ms, followed by the presentation of a cue near the top half of the screen (1). After 1500 ms, two face stimuli would appear near the bottom half
of the trial screen, from which the participant was required to make a selection in order to continue (2). Note that during Part 1 of the TI task (see
Procedure), comparison pairs constituted of happy–unhappy, neutral–happy, and neutral–unhappy face pairs; during Part 2 of the TI task, the pairs
constituted of pairs comprising the X, A, B, C, D, E, and Y stimuli. When a face was selected, its borders would be highlighted for 150 ms (3). Next, if
the presented trial type appeared during training, a feedback message appeared for 1000 ms, followed by an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 200 ms (4).
Otherwise, if the trial appeared during testing, the program immediately progressed to a 1200-ms ITI (5). This was followed by the onset of a fixation
cross, signalling a new trial sequence. (b) Trial types during relational training and tests for TI. The selections of X + A–, A + B–, C + D–, D + E–, and E
+ Y– were rewarded (solid arrow) in the presence of Cue 1 only—note that the trained discriminations were presented to participants in trials
without corrective feedback (dashed arrow) as well (1). Tests for functional symmetry, where the dashed arrow indicates the correct selection,
involved presenting comparison pairs with Cue 2 (2). Tests for functional transitivity involved presenting all combinations of the X, A, B, C, D, E,
and Y stimuli with Cue 1 and Cue 2 (3). The faces were taken from the Radboud Face database, which is publicly available research database.
2486 M. AMD AND B. ROCHE
averaged from the 15 ratings made per stimulus (so 75
ratings per participant) for each condition (baseline vs.
post). Recall that three predictions were made during
study onset. First, we predicted that the A and B
stimuli would be rated “happier” than at baseline,
while the ratings for the D and E stimuli would be
“unhappier” than at baseline. We assessed this with
four repeated measure t tests using a Bonferroni
alpha of .0025 (.01/4) to control for familywise error
rate. The α criterion was set at .01 per H0 (e.g., A-
post > A-base, D-post < D-base) instead of the conven-
tional .05 given that several null hypotheses were
being tested (Cohen, 1992, p. 156). In accordance
with predictions, the ratings for Stimulus A, t(299) =
23.1, p < .0001, d = 1.89, and Stimulus B, t = 8.69, p
< .0001, d = 0.71, were significantly higher than those
recorded at baseline. Similarly, the ratings for Stimulus
D, t = 11.62, p < .0001, d = 0.95, and Stimulus E, t = 26.3,
p < .0001, d = 2.15, were significantly lower than those
recorded at baseline. A similar contrast for Stimulus C
yielded no significant differences between baseline
and post ratings, t = 1.61, p > .1, d = 0.13. The effect
sizes (Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996, p. 171)
for the A/E and B/D pre–post contrasts are considered
very large and large, respectively, for paired t tests
(Cohen, 1988).
A second prediction was that the ratings provided
for the A, B, D, and E stimuli would demonstrate a
trend corresponding to the A > B>D > E series after
the series was established. To assess for a linear
trend across the means, we performed univariate ana-
lyses for baseline and post conditions, respectively, for
the A, B, D, and E stimuli with coefficients set to + 2,
+1, −1, and −2, respectively (given the predicted A
> B>D > E gradient). During baseline, the averaged
ratings for the A (M = 3.373, SD = 0.684), B (M = 2.906,
SD = 0.658), D (M = 3.01, SD = 0.631), and E (M = 3.21,
SD = 0.606) stimuli did not show a statistically signifi-
cant trend with equal variances assumed, F(3, 1196)
= 3.591, p = .058, η2 = .003. Levene’s test indicated
that the assumption of homogeneity was violated,
however, which required the degrees of freedom to
be adjusted from 1196 to 866, F = 3.893, p = .059.
During post, the averaged ratings for the A (M =
4.46, SD = 0.613), B (M = 3.387, SD = 0.757), D (M =
2.44, SD = 0.51), and E (M = 1.813, SD = 0.707) stimuli
showed a highly significant trend with equal variances
assumed, F(3, 1196) = 2733.301, p < .0001, η2 = .701. To
adjust for the violation of the homogeneity assump-
tion, the degrees of freedom were adjusted from
1196 to 845, F = 2692.261, p < .0001. The trend
observed in the post condition conforms with the pre-
dicted A > B>D > E gradient (Table 2).
A visual analysis of the averaged ratings for the A, B,
C, D, and E stimuli clearly indicates that the C stimulus
Table 1. Trial sequence across transitive inference task.
Trial type
Block sequence
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6
Cue train 20 10 6 4 4 4
Cue test — — — 5(4) 5(4) 5(4)
X vs. A — — 10 6 2 2
A vs. B — — 10 6 2 2
B vs. C — 10 5 6 2 2
C vs. D — 10 5 6 2 2
D vs. E — — 10 6 2 2
E vs. Y — — 10 6 2 2
X vs. A — — — 5(4) 4(3) 4(3)
A vs. B — — — 5(4) 4(3) 4(3)
B vs. C — — — 5(4) 4(3) 4(3)
C vs. D — — — 5(4) 4(3) 4(3)
D vs. E — — — 5(4) 4(3) 4(3)
E vs. Y — — — 5(4) 4(3) 4(3)
A vs. X — — — — 5(4) 4(3)
B vs. A — — — — 5(4) 4(3)
C vs. B — — — — 5(4) 4(3)
D vs. C — — — — 5(4) 4(3)
E vs. D — — — — 5(4) 4(3)
X vs. B — — — — — 5(4)
X vs. C — — — — — 5(4)
X vs. D — — — — — 5(4)
X vs. E — — — — — 5(4)
X vs. Y — — — — — 5(4)
A vs. C — — — — — 5(4)
A vs. D — — — — — 5(4)
A vs. E — — — — — 5(4)
A vs. Y — — — — — 5(4)
B vs. D — — — — — 5(4)
B vs. E — — — — — 5(4)
B vs. Y — — — — — 5(4)
C vs. E — — — — — 5(4)
C vs. Y — — — — — 5(4)
D vs. Y — — — — — 5(4)
Min.
trials
20 30 56 75 70 135
Note: Trial type: trial types that participants were trained/tested on.
For the cue training and testing trial types, participants were
shown happy/neutral, neutral/unhappy, and happy/unhappy face
pairs in the presence of Cues 1 and 2, where they were reinforced
to select the happier face in the presence of Cue 1 and the unhap-
pier face in the presence of Cue 2. The remaining trial types (e.g., X
vs. A, B vs. C, etc.) describe the specific comparison pairs that were
presented over the course of the task. Trial numbers in italics indi-
cate the fixed number of rewarded, training trials. For test trial
numbers, the numbers within parentheses indicate the success cri-
terion for a specific trial type; for instance, “5(4)” indicates that for
5 presentations of a specific trial type, 4 correct discriminations in
the absence of feedback was the success criterion. Min. trials: the
minimum number of trials per block. Note that, for Blocks 1 to 3,
the number of training trials were fixed. For Blocks 4 to 6, the
minimum number of trials are presented, although the number
could increase since participants could be re-exposed to the non-
reinforced test-trial types for a maximum of 3 times if the success
criterion was not met.
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was rated as happier than the B and D stimuli across
both the baseline and post conditions (Figure 3). To
determine whether the ratings for the C stimulus func-
tioned as an outlier in the present study, we con-
ducted univariate analyses for the A, B, D, E, and C
stimuli with coefficients set to −1, −1, −1, −1, and 4,
respectively, for the baseline and post conditions.
The ratings for Stimulus C were significantly different
from the averaged ratings for the A, B, D, and E
stimuli during baseline, F(1, 1495) = 603.861, p
< .0001, η2 = .288, as well as during post, F(1, 1495) =
771.857, p < .0001, η2 = .340. The results suggest that
relational categorization did not suffice to alter the
valence of the already salient C stimulus.
Frontal alpha asymmetry
As the predictions for the FAA scores were similar to
the self-report ratings, a similar battery of statistical
tests were conducted. First, the post and baseline
FAAs of stimuli A/B and D/E using four repeated
measure t-tests with an adjusted Bonferroni alpha of
.0025 were obtained. The FAAs for Stimulus A in the
post condition was significant compared to baseline,
t(19) = 3.030, p < .004, d = 0.89. The pre–post FAA con-
trasts for the remaining stimuli B, t = 1.44, p > .08, d =
0.39, C, t = 0.34, p > .16, d = 0.05, D, t = 0.32, p > .37, d =
0.08, and E, t = 1.04, p > .15, d = 0.23, were not signifi-
cantly different between the two conditions (see
Table 3). Across the five contrasts, only the pre–post
A contrast produced a large effect (d = 0.78). Using
the reported effect sizes, powers for the pre–post
FAAs for the A, B, C, D, and E stimuli were calculated
to be 96%, 63%, 12%, 11%, and 41%, respectively,
with α set at .01 and a sample size of 20 (using
GPower*3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
This suggests the inconclusive FAA results were due
to a lack of power. A sensitivity analysis (Faul et al.,
2007, p. 177) revealed that the minimum effect size
for a sufficiently sensitive test would be 0.76, which
only the pre–post FAA contrast for Stimulus A
yielded. A prospective power analysis with α = .01, d
= 0.8, and power at 80%, showed that a sample size
of 19 should have sufficed to detect large effects (d
= 0.8). Note that, while this may have been the case
Table 2. Repeated measure t tests contrasting baseline versus post happiness ratings for Stimuli A, B, C, D, and E.
Stimuli
Baseline Post
t(299) p (1-tail)a 95% CI Cohen’s dbM SD M SD
A 3.373 0.684 4.461 0.612 23.144 <.0001 [−1.18, −0.99] 1.89
B 2.907 0.657 3.387 0.755 8.703 <.0001 [−0.59, −0.37] 0.71
C 4.203 0.801 4.297 0.896 1.610 .1084 [−0.29, 0.02] 0.13
D 3.010 0.630 2.442 0.510 11.575 <.0001 [0.47, 0.67] 0.95
E 3.210 0.605 1.813 0.706 26.257 <.0001 [1.29, 1.50] 2.15
Note: CI = confidence interval.
aThe Bonferroni adjusted alpha value was .0025. A one-directional contrast was conducted as the ratings were predicted to go in specific direc-
tions for each stimulus. bIndicates magnitude of the effect.
Figure 3. Baseline (left) and post (right) mean ratings of “happiness” along a 5-point Likert scale (along the y-axis), where the ratings range from
“1 = very unhappy” to “5 = very happy”. Stimuli A, B, C, D, and E are presented along the x-axis. Note that for Stimuli A and B, post ratings were
significantly higher (p < .0001) than those observed at baseline. Alternatively, for Stimuli D and E, post ratings were significantly lower (p < .0001)
than those at baseline. Ratings for the C (self) stimulus did not significantly vary between baseline and post ratings. Error bars indicate standard
deviations and are one-sided in order to conserve space. Note that the trend for baseline was non-significant, F = 3.893, p = .059, whereas the
trend observed at post corresponded significantly, F = 2692.261, p < .0001, with the predicted A > B>D > E gradient.
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for the self-report data provided above, it may not be
applicable to the FAA data (cf. Hagemann, 2004). That
is, given the low signal-to-noise ratio typical of electro-
physiological measures (Teplan, 2002), at least when
compared to a self-report rating scale, it is likely that
a larger sample would be required for significant
FAA contrasts to be detected. This is further corrobo-
rated by the design of the study, which would
predict smaller effect sizes for stimuli that were
closer to the intermediate term in the series (i.e.,
Stimuli B and D) than for those that were closer to
the end anchors (Stimuli A and E). A lack of significant
differences across the board does not necessarily indi-
cate that the FAA metric was insensitive to the
manipulation, however, as a visual inspection of the
trends across members of the series in Figure 4
reveals. Specifically, the trends in FAA resemble, at
least superficially, those that were observed for the
self-reported ratings (Figure 3), indicating some sensi-
tivity to the emergent valence gradient.
To assess whether the FAA shifts were significant,
we assessed for linear trends among the FAAs for
baseline and post conditions for the A, B, D, and E
stimuli with coefficients set to +2, +1, −1, and −2,
respectively, as before. During baseline, the FAAs for
the A (M = 0.023, SD = 0.143), B (M = 0.015, SD =
0.175), D (M = 0.031, SD = 0.208), and E (M = 0.07, SD
= 0.19) stimuli did not show a statistically significant
trend, F(3, 76) = 0.739, p = .393, η2 = .010. During
post, the FAAs for the A (M = 0.159, SD = 0.162), B (M
= 0.089, SD = 0.204), D (M = 0.177, SD = 0.040), and E
(M = 0.017, SD = 0.212) stimuli demonstrated the pre-
dicted trend, F(3, 76) = 5.927, p = .017, η2 = .072. As
with the ratings data, the post FAAs showed a statisti-
cally significant linear trend in accordance with a A > B
> D > E structure (Figure 4).
Finally, we employed a univariate analysis to con-
trast the FAAs of the A, B, D, E, and C stimuli utilizing
coefficients of −1, −1, −1, −1, and 4, respectively, for
the baseline and post conditions. Similar to the
outcome reported for the ratings data, the FAA for
Stimulus C was significantly greater than the FAAs
for Stimuli A, B, D, and E during baseline, F(1, 95) =
15.371, p < .0001, η2 = .139, and during post, F(1, 95)
= 9.902, p = .002, η2 = .094. Similar to the results for
the ratings data, the current analysis indicates that
relational categorization did not have a significant
effect on the FAAs for Stimulus C.
Table 3. Repeated measure t tests contrasting baseline versus post FAAs for Stimuli A, B, C, D, and E.
Stimuli
Baseline Post
t(19) p (1-tail) 95% CI Cohen’s dM SD M SD
A 0.023 0.143 0.159 0.162 3.030 <.004 [−0.23, −0.042] −0.89
B 0.015 0.176 0.089 0.204 1.444 >.08 [−0.59, −0.37] −0.39
C 0.226 0.237 0.238 0.226 0.342 >.36 [−0.29, 0.02] −0.05
D 0.031 0.202 0.016 0.171 −0.318 >.37 [0.47, 0.67] 0.08
E 0.070 0.185 0.017 0.264 −1.040 >.15 [1.29, 1.50] 0.23
Note: FAA = frontal alpha asymmetry. CI = confidence interval.
Figure 4. Frontal alpha asymmetries (FAAs) acquired during baseline (left panel) and post (right panel) conditions. R = right; L = left. Positive
values indicate greater activation over the left prefrontal cortex (PFC) than over the right PFC; negative values indicate greater activation over the
right PFC than over the left PFC. The baseline versus post change in elicited FAAs observed for Stimulus A was significantly different (p < .007).
The remaining contrasts were non-significant. Similar to the ratings data, a significant, F(3, 76) = 5.927, p = .017, η2 = .072, linear trend was
observed during the post condition but not in the baseline condition, F(3, 76) = 0.739, p = .393, η2 = .010, indicating the presence of a gradient
corresponding to A > B>D > E. *Calculation of the normalized FAA metric (cf. Allen, Urry, et al., 2004).
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It is worth noting the obvious correspondence
between the ratings and FAAs across both conditions
for Stimulus C (Figures 3 and 4). Whether this is exclu-
sively related to stimulus valence, familiarity, and/or
motivation (cf. Berkman & Lieberman, 2010; Harmon-
Jones, 2003) remains unknown, though it is not
unwarranted to assume that both measures reflect
stimulus valence to some degree. In any case,
holding the effect for Stimulus C constant, we can con-
clude that the valences of the A, B, D, and E stimuli
transformed in accordance with the structure of the
relational series.
Discussion
The goal of the current study was to assess whether
the valences of blurred face stimuli could be trans-
formed by virtue of membership in a seven-element
series, and whether such a transformation could
affect a stimulus that was emotionally salient a priori.
Performance across the self-report and FAA
measures indicate that the functions of all stimuli,
other than Stimulus C, had transformed in accordance
with the relational structure of the series established.
That is, the valences of the unfamiliar blurred faces
fell along a gradient predicted by a X >happy A >happy
B >happy C >happy D >happy E >happy Y series, sans Stimu-
lus C. This was most apparent when viewing the
trends for the self-reported ratings (Figure 3) and the
FAAs (Figure 4) during the post condition. Critically,
the A and B stimuli elicited higher happiness ratings
and greater right prefrontal alpha activation than the
D and E stimuli. Given that neither the A nor the E
stimuli constituted “end anchors” of the series, the
pre versus post differences are unlikely to have been
driven by associative value transfer processes (e.g.,
Wynne, 1995). The high happiness ratings and FAAs
reported for Stimulus C during baseline and post
measurements suggest a relation between FAA and
valence, motivation and/or familiarity (cf. Coan &
Allen, 2003). The FAA shifts recorded for Stimuli B, D,
and E, while individually non-significant (Table 2),
nevertheless showed the predicted trend (Figure 4).
The lack of significant FAA differences across the indi-
vidual stimulus contrasts may be due to a lack in the
sensitivity of the FAA measure—namely, trans-
formed/derived valence effects (cf. Harmon-Jones
et al., 2010), or it may be that FAAs were confounded
by value transfer from the highly salient stimulus C
(e.g., Greene, Spellman, Levy, Dusek, & Eichenbaum,
2001), although both interpretations are speculative
(more on FAA limitations in a moment). This suggests
that, while useful, FAA measures may be best sup-
plemented by additional dependent measures, such
as self-reports or implicit measures (e.g., Amd &
Barnes-Holmes, 2014; Amd & Roche, 2015, 2016). All
in all, the performances observed here suggest that
stimulus valence is at least partially a function of the
relational structure of which it is an element, support-
ing earlier findings (e.g., Amd & Roche, 2015, 2016).
Alternatively, if a stimulus is already highly salient
and/or familiar, relational categorization may have
little effect on its baseline valence level, demonstrat-
ing a boundary condition for the TOF effect, at least
using current procedures. The results indicate that
under certain conditions (e.g., when the member of
a structure is highly valenced a priori, such as the
self-images used here), the derivation of the predicted
relations may not suffice for TOF to be observed. For
instance, note how Stimulus C was rated as
“happier” than Stimulus B even though participants
learned the B >happy C relation during TI training and
testing. One reason for this difference may be that,
while the TI procedure involved training a B >happy C
relation directly, Stimulus C was already “different”
from other face stimuli along a salience/valence
dimension. It is also possible that Stimulus C may
have participated in a “same-as” and/or hierarchical
relation with the participant (as it was his/her own
face). If so, the hierarchical relational structure may
have interfered with TOF in the current series (cf. Slat-
tery & Stewart, 2014). In order to determine whether
this was the case, future researchers can attempt to
strengthen stimulus relations to supersede pre-exist-
ing ones (e.g., through overtraining—cf. Bortoloti,
Rodrigues, Cortez, Pimentel, & de Rose, 2013) and to
note whether such interventions can transform the
functions of a highly salient (e.g., self-image) stimulus.
In any case, our findings indicate that while TOF
can be readily observed in experimental preparations
employing relatively “neutral” elements (e.g., Amd &
Roche, 2016), the valences of non-neutral elements
may not be as susceptible to TOF. This suggests that
emotionally salient elements can maintain their
valence even while constituting a member of a rela-
tional structure/series that provides countering infor-
mation (i.e., rating C >happy B after learning B >happy
C). In turn, these findings explain how instructions to
suppress dissonant emotions may not always
succeed (cf. Spokas, Luterek, & Heimberg, 2009).
Future researchers could explore whether the
valence shifts (in ratings and FAAs) can be affected
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by the presentation of one’s name with any blurred
face stimulus. This would separate the effects of stimu-
lus salience and relational series position on the
valence of purely verbal and/or purely topographical
(e.g., facial), personally salient, stimuli.
The current findings indicate that humans appraise
their own faces as more positively valenced than non-
familiar faces. While the non-significant FAA shifts
observed in the presence of the B, D, and E stimuli
challenge the utility of FAA as a reliable metric of
emotional valence, it is worth bearing in mind that
the evoked FAAs may have been confounded by
factors not controlled for (e.g., menstruation cycles,
sleeping habits; see Bazanova & Vernon, 2014). Never-
theless, the explicitly reported ratings suggest that it is
at least plausible that the FAAs represent stimulus
valence to some degree (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al.,
2010; Schöne, Schomberg, Gruber, & Quirin, 2015),
although further research is required to explicate the
ways in which these two measures are functionally
related. As noted previously, while some researchers
have found FAA to be sensitive to valences estab-
lished via conditioning (e.g., Cunningham, Espinet,
DeYoung, & Zelazo, 2005), others have contested
this claim and suggested FAA as more representative
of approach tendencies than stimulus valence per se
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2010). While the details of this
debate are beyond the scope of the present article,
the key point is that FAA may be sensitive to valences
that are inferred/derived as a consequence of their
position within a relational series (e.g., Amd & Roche,
2015, 2016) as opposed to purely on the basis of
direct pairing (i.e., classical conditioning; see Cunning-
ham et al., 2005). Maintaining this distinction between
“conditioned” and “derived” valence change effects
may be important in explaining the establishment of
stimulus valences (Amd & Roche, 2015, p. 538). On
balance, while identifying the neural substrates of
these differing processes would be welcome, it is
not necessary (cf. Miller, 2010; Miller, Crocker, Spiel-
berg, Infantolino, & Heller, 2015; Staddon, 2014) for
the purposes of experimental control.
Some potential limitations of the present study are
worth noting. First, somemay criticize our use of a nor-
malized difference score [i.e., (R – L)/(R + L)] to
compute FAA differences rather than calculating the
difference between naturally log-transformed values
(i.e., ln-R – ln-L), given the issues of reliability with
the former (Allen, Coan, et al., 2004). On balance,
Overall and Woodward (1975) demonstrated that
reduced reliability for difference scores can yield
higher power for detecting significant differences.
Given that the present study, along with Amd and
Roche (2016), constitutes among the first known
investigations of stimulus-elicited FAAs in relation to
derived emotional effects, we believe that a powerful
measure for detecting statistical differences is pre-
sently more valuable than prematurely relating the
effects to the self-report measures. Additionally, the
normalized difference score has shown a correlation
exceeding .99 in relation to the natural log asymmetry
measure (Allen, Urry, et al., 2004), indicating both to be
robust measures of the asymmetry metric.
A second matter is the lack of topographical maps
of pre and post FAA activation, which is related to our
use of a normalized score. The reason for excluding
them is that it is difficult to ascribe the observation
of a positive FAA value to increased alpha activity
over the right LPFC or decreased alpha activity over
the left LPFC when using such scores (Bazanova &
Vernon, 2014; Hagemann, 2004). Future researchers
can employ more rigorous techniques, such as resi-
dualizing power at a specific electrode site with a hier-
archical regression, and then correlating the
residualized values with the variables of interest, in
order to determine regions of interest (cf. Wheeler,
Davidson, & Tomarken, 1993). Given the apparent
incommensurability of a “standard” alpha generator
across individuals (e.g., Bazanova & Vernon, 2014), it
is more constructive at present to focus on the func-
tional aspects underlying alpha asymmetry effects
over anterior regions (cf. Klimesch, 2012).
A third matter involves the ecological validity of
extrapolating from experimental findings with artifi-
cially blurred human faces, which are not typical to
natural circumstances. As noted previously, the faces
here were blurred in order to prevent participants
from inferring emotional states that could have other-
wise counteracted the information provided through
series membership. Consequently, the present prep-
aration allowed determining the influence of rela-
tional structure on stimulus valence gradients while
minimizing counter-control by stimulus features
prima facie (e.g., Mcllvane & Dube, 2003). Subsequent
preparations could employ natural faces and/or
emotional contexts other than happiness, given that
the latter can be inferred even when a face has been
normatively rated as emotionally neutral.
Fourth, one could question whose happiness a par-
ticipant was responding to as they provided their
image ratings. That is, given the instructions “Please
indicate how ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’ the image makes
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you feel”, participants may have responded to each
stimulus in relation to the trained and derived
relations within the series (e.g., A is happier than B)
or to each stimulus in relation to themselves (e.g., A
is happier relative to me). Given the TOFs observed
for the A, B, D, and E stimuli, one could argue that
the participants were providing ratings based on the
relations trained. On balance, the consistently high
ratings for Stimulus C, even after learning relations
such as B >happy C, suggest that participants were
responding to the C stimulus in relation to themselves.
This raises the question of whether rating Stimulus A
as “happier than” C, for instance, means that the par-
ticipant is happier in the presence of A, or whether
she is simply describing the relationally relative
valence of A. While the inclusion of additional depen-
dent measures might clarify this issue somewhat (e.g.,
Amd & Roche, 2016; Dougher et al., 2007), future
researchers can delve into state differences to see
whether they would affect TOF for a priori salient
stimuli. For example, one could measure the extent
to which current mood indicators effect the valences
of a self-stimulus, and whether this could influence
TOF in a systematic way.
Finally, one may well ask what “happy” meant in
the context of the present experiment. The reader
should note that “happiness” was not employed
here as a technical term but simply to maintain the
reader’s orientation towards the phenomenon of
interest (TOF). The emotion-eliciting functions of any
stimulus, including “happiness” functions, can be ana-
lysed in terms of various hypothetical sub-com-
ponents (Gerber et al., 2008), the most common
being the bifurcated dimensions of valence and
arousal. Briefly, valence indicates the degree to
which a stimulus is appetitive or aversive for an organ-
ism, and arousal refers to the elicited degree of phys-
iological excitability (Kensinger, 2004). Although it is
likely that “happiness” refers to some combination of
valence and arousal, the reader should note that the
“happier than” and “unhappier than” cues used pre-
sently can be read as “more positively valenced” and
“more negatively valenced”, respectively. Such cues
function as “imperative environmental facts (deter-
mining) the direction of the behavior” ( Lewin, 1935,
p. 77), where the “happiest” and “unhappiest”
members of the series can be conceptualized as oppo-
site ends along a valence continuum (Tolman, 1932,
p. 81). In such cases, the size of a relational series
should not affect the primary prediction of the direc-
tion of valence gradients across series (Amd &
Roche, 2015). Nevertheless, future researchers
wishing to assess whether such a continuum is appli-
cable along other emotional dimensions could repli-
cate the present work using cues specifying
alternate relational emotions (e.g., angrier than,
calmer than) to see whether similar TOF gradients
emerge.
Important theoretical implications arising from the
present findings relate to the observation that
responses towards an emotionally masked face may
at least partly be a function of the relational struc-
ture(s) of which it is a member (Amd & Roche,
2015). First, given the clear TOF effects observed for
the A and E stimuli, it appears that constituting end-
terms in a relational series was not a significant con-
found in TOF yields here or elsewhere (e.g., Amd &
Roche, 2015). Secondly, TOF can take place when
the stimuli related within a valence-occasioning
context are emotionally homogeneous in relation to
each other. If a highly salient/familiar stimulus is intro-
duced, however, relational series membership may
have little influence on the emotional properties of
the salient element prima facie. Our results indicate
that emotional reactions to faces need neither be
directly learned nor instructed as a rule, but can be
derived through the logical relations they share with
other symbolic stimuli (Dymond & Roche, 2013;
Dymond et al., 2014; Holt, 1914). Thus, TOF is more
readily observed when the related stimuli are not
salient, motivating and/or familiar a priori. Simply
put, the relations between stimuli determine the
direction of the valence gradient across them only if
those stimuli were emotionally homogeneous and
relatively neutral to begin with. This highlights a
boundary condition of the TOF process for the first
time, which has been garnering increasing attention
from symbolic communication researchers (Dymond
& Roche, 2013).
From a broader perspective, the current findings
highlight how elements embedded within the same
knowledge structure may give rise to feelings of
“dissonance” (Jansz & Timmers, 2002), which in turn
can produce feelings of unease. Although the
present study did not assess “unease” per se, the
pre versus post valence ratings indicate how such
unease could arise if the elements being related
are disparate enough. For instance, if a participant
is presented with a stimulus that is already positively
valenced towards her, and is then informed that
some other, lesser valenced stimulus should be
responded to more positively than the original
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stimulus (e.g., B >happy C in the present study), it is
easy to see how she might resist responding to the
first stimulus as more negative than the latter (cf.
McConnell & Leibold, 2001). Given enough of a dis-
parity between the two stimuli (e.g., requiring a
Christian to respond to the Islamic crescent as a posi-
tively valenced symbol; see Kraemer, 1997), unease is
likely to emerge. Taken together, this suggests that
while relational knowledge structures play a key
role in higher cognition (cf. Halford, Wilson, & Phillips,
2010), such knowledge is less likely to have an influ-
ence on emotionally salient elements embedded
within those structures, at least within the period of
a single experimental session. Future research could
attempt to expand upon the relational series estab-
lished here (e.g., by using different exemplar types,
real-world cues, combinations of relation-types) in
order to assess the type of structure necessary to
alter the valences of salient elements, short of
direct pairings with biologically relevant stimuli (cf.
Amd et al., 2013; Dougher et al., 2007).
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates a
transformation of valence functions for masked face
stimuli following membership within the same rela-
tional series. In doing so, a possible boundary con-
dition for the TOF effect was identified. Specifically,
newly established relational structures may fail to
alter the valence of self-image stimuli across a single
session, presumably based on their a priori salience.
On a general level, these findings highlight how disso-
nance can persist after emotionally salient elements
become incorporated into the same relational knowl-
edge structure.
Notes
1. Abstract shapes were used in lieu of naturally occurring
phrases (such as “is happier than” and “is unhappier
than”) given that the latter are used in everyday discourse
and may not have been situationally equivalent across all
the participants involved.
2. Note that while the validity of a Cz reference electrode for
identifying the source of alpha activity has been con-
tested (Hagemann, 2004), it nevertheless remains the
most commonly used reference in FAA research (Amd &
Roche, 2016; Coan & Allen, 2003; Huang et al., 2015) vali-
dating its employment for the present inquiry. For further
details, see Footnote 2 in Amd and Roche (2016).
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